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HUMAN CAPITAL DEVEWPMENT IN THE UAE: 
ANALYSIS OF BUDGETARY CONFLICTS 
IN AN ERA OF RELATIVE AUSTERITY 
Robert E. Looney 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the manner in which the government of 
the UAE adjusted to declines in oil revenues in the mid- to late 
1980s. Specifically, was the government able to support the 
continuation of investment in human capital that began after the oil 
price increases of 1973/74? In this regard, what were the main 
budgetary tradeoffs associated with educational expenditures? Did 
the country's high levels of defense expenditure significantly 
diverted funds from human capital development? Did the funding, 
for education suffer in proportionate to other major expenditure 
items during the current period of relatively slack oil revenues? 
Based on the answers to these questions, several conclusions are 
drawn concerning the ability of the country to reduce its 
dependence on foreign workers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The population of the UAE doubled between 1975 and 1983, 
from 558,000 to 1, 195,000. In 1981, immigration was continuing 
at such a rate that projections forecast the population at 1.23 
million by 1985. As it turned out, by 1986, the latest year for 
official figures, the population had reached 1. 67 million. The 
UAE's main concern, however, is not the overall siz.e of its 
population but its composition. 
The 1980 census figures revealed only 20 percent of the 
population were U AE nationals. That census gave rise to 
predictions that, by 1990, nationals would account for no more 
than 10-12 percent of the population. Such fears were compounded 
when oil revenues started to subside in 1981-82, drawing the 
authorities' attention to the fact that expatriates were being paid to 
run all kinds of social services such as health care, education and 
housing, demand for which was largely created by the expatriates 
themselves. <1> 
The government's immediate response was to propose a 
twenty-two percent staffing cut in the health and education 
departments. Although this target was -soon dismissed as 
unworkable, it has remained a primary long term government 
objective, and in fact has resulted in a fairly sharp reduction in the 
expansion of the foreign workforce. <2> 
Clearly, two factors will determine the extent to which the 
Emirates will be able to reduce their dependence on foreign 
workers: (1) the ability of the country to attract local youth into 
educational programs as preparation for many of the jobs currently 
manned almost exclusively by expatriates, and (2) the ability of the 
government to fund these programs in an environment of relatively 
slack oil markets and intense funding competition from other 
government departments, particularly defense. 
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This paper focuses on the latter issue. What are the main 
budgetary tradeoffs associated with educational expenditures? 
Have the country's high levels of defense expenditure significantly 
diverted funds from human capital development? Has the funding 
for education suffered in proportionate to other major expenditure 
items during the current period of relatively slack oil revenues? 
Based on the answers to these questions, several conclusions will 
be drawn concerning the ability of the country to reduce its 
dependence on foreign workers. 
DEMOGRAPIDC TRENDS 
The distinctive features of the U AE' s population are the 
preponderance of foreigners and the shortage of females (Table 1). 
The total population increased by 6 percent between 1975 and 
1980, as a result of the massive influx of immigrant workers after 
the 1973/74 oil boom. Many expatriates have left since the 
recession that begin during 1982/83, but the census in 1985 found 
a population of 1.62 million, 64.9 percent of which was male. The 
December 1980 census had put the total population at 1,042,099, 
with 717,475 males and 322,800 females, reflecting the bachelor 
status of a large part of the community. <3> 
The composition of the population in terms of nationality, sex 
and age group differs from emirate to emirate. At the time of the 
1980 census, for example, the proportion of males aged between 
20 and 39 years was greatest in Abu Dhabi at 4 7 percent, second 
in Dubai at 39 percent and lowest in Ajman at 29 percent. This in 
turn reflects in part the distribution of non-nationals. The ratio of 
UAE nationals to immigrants is an extremely sensitive issue and 
official statistics on the breakdown are not readily available. <4> 
When the federal planning ministry drafted a five year 
development plan to begin in 1980, it assumed a non-national 
majority of 70:30 and an average annual growth rate of the 
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indigenous population of 3 percent. In fact, the ratio at that time 
was probably nearer 80:20, with expatriates from the Indian 
subcontinent accounting for 45 percent of the total population. The 
next largest grouping would have been Iranians, making up 16-18 
percent, followed by non-UAE Arabs, accounting for perhaps 13 
percent and Westerners some 5 percent. <5> 
Efforts to curb the immigration process date back to 1977, but 
it was not until the early 1980s that a consensus could be reached 
among all emirates on this issue. For a long time, Dubai, with 
plans for extensive industrialization at Jebel Ali, took a more 
liberal attitude to the question and, in 1978, for instance, 71,000 
of the 164,000 work permits issued were for Dubai. Since late 
1981, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs has been very 
active in restricting the issuing of visas to workers from overseas 
and this, combined with the large scale departure of construction 
workers whose tasks were finished, may have had some impact on 
the composition of the population by nationality. <6> 
Additional measures taken to reduce the size of the foreign 
workforce include: (7) 
1. According to a Federal Labor Law enacted in 1980, 
businesses are required to increase participation by UAE 
nationals in the workforce. While enforcement has been 
sporadic, private businesses are being pressed by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs to provide training for nationals and to 
employ nationals whenever possible. It is desired that 20 
percent of company posts eventually be occupied by nationals. 
2. The same law imposes strictlimitations on the mobility of 
foreignworkers, requiring them to leave the UAEbefore they 
change employers. As of February 1984, it is no longer 
sufficient for foreign workers to leave the UAE briefly in 
order to arrange or a new sponsor and get a new visa; a six 
month waiting period has been decreed. 
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TABLE 1 
Population in the UAE and Other Gulf Countries: 1986 
(nationals and non-nationals) 
Country Nationals 
Total Male Female 
% % 
UAE 434,449 51.4 48.6 
Saudi Arabia 7,012,974 51.1 48.9 
Kuwait 750,466 49.8 50.2 
Oman 816,000 47.3 52.7 
Bahrain 295,168 50.3 49.7 
Qatar 105,045 49.9 50.1 
Total 9,414,102 50.7 49.3 
---------------------------------Country non-Nationals 
Total Male Female % Population 
% % 
UAE 1,239,204 73.8 26.2 74 
S. Arabia 3,150,756 61.2 11.2 31 
Kuwait , 1,072,296 49.8 38.7 59 
Oman 494,000 73.6 26.4 38 
Bahrain 139,556 75.4 24.6 32 
Qatar 284,209 70.1 29.9 73 
Total 6,380,021 77.5 22.5 40 
(continued) 
578 LOONEY 
TABLE 1 (continued) 
Population in the UAE and Other Gulf Countries: 1986 



























Source: United Nations, Economic and Social Commission of 
West Asia (ESCWA), Demographic and Related Socitr&:onomic 
Data Sheets (Baghdad: ESCWA, 1987). 
3. Entry visas may now be issued to foreign domestics if their 
sponsors in the UAE have a monthly income of Dh 7,000 
($1,906) or more, while foreign workers wishing to bring their 
families with them must have a monthly income of at least Dh 
3,500 ($953). 
4. Companies which bring in more than five foreign workers 
at one time are now required to deposit bank guarantees 
covering return airfare for the employees they sponsor. In 
addition, they are restricted to one visa application per month. 
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5. Foreign companies which do not have a local partner are 
no longer being issued work permits and such permits as have 
already been issued to these companies are not being renewed. 
6. A new system has been set up to monitor expatriates, 
particularly to ensure (through computeri7.a.tion) that workers 
do not by-pass restrictions because of lack of enforcement due 
to a multiplicity of responsible agencies. 
7. The various ministries are now engaged in an effort to cut 
the percentage of foreigners they employ, a step which could 
have the beneficial side-effect of aiding the government's 
current budgetary problems. 
8. Inspection campaigns have been initiated to crack down on 
illegal immigration and employers violating labor regulations. 
9. The Ministry of Agriculture has taken steps to reduce by 
one-half the number of expatriates employed in agriculture 
(estimated at 20,000) by 1990. 
These steps are believed to have succeeded at least in 
stemming the growth of the percentage of foreigners. However, 
while such measures may mitigate some of the undesired 
phenomena listed above, they could as easily provoke hostilities. , 
They have led to higher labor costs and a reduction in the 
flexibility employers enjoy to expand or modify their range of 
products. Most likely they have also raised social tensions as 
foreigners have become fearful of deportation or termination. <8> 
Perhaps as a result of these difficulties, the government has 
retracted several of the provisions listed above. For example, the 
rule which required expatriates to leave the country for six months 
before changing jobs was dropped in mid-1984, after its adverse 
effects on highly skilled professional workers became apparent. In 
addition, restrictions preventing dependents from entering the 
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country have come under criticism since family units are widely 
considered far more stable and desirable than single sex 
workcamps. A Ministry of Labor study in 1985 actually called for 
measures to encourage foreign workers to live in the UAE with 
their families and predicted a slight increase in the number of 
dependents arriving in coming years. <9> 
The pattern of employment (Table 2) reflects a number of 
these social and technical realities. The large foreign workforce is, 
of course, a direct result of the low participation rates of the local 
population, particularly among females. The high ratio of 
foreigners employed in construction, transportation and 
communications reflects the emphasis on infrastructure 
development and a lingering boom mentality still prevalent despite 
the reduction in oil revenues. 
Government services absorb a large number of nationals, 
especially educated ones, asevidenced by the high wages in that 
sector. Trade attracts a large number of workers, partially because 
it presents many opportunities in an open rapidly growing 
economy, and partly because of the commercial traditions of the 
local population. While the oil sector remains the most productive 
sector and commands the third highest wages, it accounts (1986) 
for only 1.1 percent of total employment. Agriculture, which used 
to be a major employer before the discovery of oil, has very low 
productivity and as a result commands such low pay that only 6.2 
percent of the labor force is employed in this sector. 
Manufacturing, although it has grown in importance in recent 
years, employs only 8.1 percent of the labor force. 
BUDGETARY PATTERNS 
In terms of the actual public sector budgets, the UAE is 
somewhat unique in that its Federal Budget is considerably smaller 
what one might expect given the confederation's oil revenues. In 
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TABLE2 
The United Arab Emirates: 
Labor Force by Economic Sector, 1983-1986 
Sector 1983 1986 % 
# % # % Change 
Agriculture 33,300 5.8 38,400 6.2 4.9 
Mining, oil 7,900 1.4 7,000 1.1 - 4.0 
Manufac 49,40 8.6 50,100 8.1 0.5 
Electricity 16,000 2.8 21,000 3.4 9.5 
Construct 126,000 22.0 112,300 18.1 - 3.8 
Trade 89,900 15.7 97,300 15.7 2.7 
Transport 72,800 12.7 67,200 10.8 - 2.6 
Finance 13,200 2.3 12,300 2.0 - 2.3 
Real Estate 1,100 0.2 2,700 0.4 34.9 
Other Serv 76,600 13.3 65,900 10.6 - 4.9 
Government 85,800 15.0 104,900 16.9 6.9 
Household na 38,700 6.2 
Total 573,900 100.0 619, 700 100.0 0.4* 
Source:, Economist Intelligence Unit, Colllltry Projik 1987-88: 
United Arab F.mirates (London: EIU, 1987), p.13. 
* rate of growth excludes domestic household. 
actuality, there are three figures for revenues and expenditures: (1) 
the consolidated accounts for the federal government, combined 
with those of the emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah and Ras 
al-Khaimah; (2) the federal budget and (3) the Abu Dhabi budget. 
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There are differences between the three in terms of the source of 
reven~e as well as expenditure priorities. Unfortunately, Abu 
Dhabi has not released a breakdown of its revenues since 1979. 
For the other two, some interesting patterns appear: 
1. In 1986 oil receipts accounted for 8.9 percent of total 
revenues recorded under the consolidated accounts, while other 
revenue, including domestic and foreign borrowing and 
investment income, accounted for 19.5 percent. This category 
had provided only 8.4 percent of revenue in 1982. 
2. Current spending accounted for 75.6 percent of total 
expenditure, with defense, health and education the leading 
categories. • 
3. Development spending within the consolidated accounts 
was dominated in 1986, as in previous years, by the 
municipalities, industries and electricity, reflecting spending 
patterns in both the Abu Dhabi and the federal budgets. 
4. Spending on industry is contained only in the consolidated 
budgets, indicating little support for industry at the federal 
level. Government spending on industry is, therefore, for all 
practical purposes under the complete control of each 
individual emirate. 
5. Spending on education has declined fairly sharply in recent 
years, particularly in the development section of the budget. 
There has also been a significant reduction in the development 
funds allocated to health. Current expenditures on both items, 
while contracting a bit, have been much more stable. 
A corollary of the federal government's desire to reduce the 
number of foreigners in the country is its determination to 
encourage growth within the indigenous population. This has 
repercussions on the volume of welfare payments given to UAE 
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nationals to encourage child rearing, and on the scale of health and 
education that will have to be sustained to care for the growing 
number of young people. In 1980, despite the large proportion of 
20-40 year old expatriates in the country, 34 percent of the 
population was aged 19 and under. 
Since oil revenues began to subside in 1981and1982 there has 
been growing concern that higher spending on health and education 
has been necessary because it caters to the dependents of 
expatriates. Proposals for staffing cuts focused on the ministries 
of education and health, which still employ approximately 18,000 
and 11,000 people respectively--together accounting for nearly 
three quarters of all federal government employees. Of 98,694 
pupils in government schools in 1984-85, 23, 723 were non-
nationals. Another outcome of the new attitude to the welfare state 
has been the introduction of health charges for expatriates. 
In 1985, there were 760 schools (both private sand public) in 
the emirates. These schools accommodated nearly 300,000 
students, with 17.0,000 in government schools and 90,000 in 
private institutions. Enrollments have been up considerably in 
recent years, particularly in secondary education. The government 
has been trying to discourage expatriates from entering states 
schools, where classes are often too large. Most teachers are 
expatriates. <10> 
Even if educational provisions for immigrants' children are 
reduced, spending on education for nationals will have to reflect 
the current 3-4 percent growth rate in the indigenous population. 
Teaching salaries will also have to rise if teachers are to be drawn 
from the national community, especially if they are to account for 
any significant percentage of the 26,000 teachers that will probably 
be needed by the end of the century. <11> 
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BUDGETARY TRADE-OFFS 
Returning to the questions asked at the beginning of the paper: 
does the concentration of public sector expenditures at the local 
rather than federal level produce budgetary patterns in which 
defense expenditures are made at the expense of education? A 
cursory look at the detailed composition of the Central Government 
Budget suggests: 
1. While growing at 27. 9 percent in constant prices over the 
1973/80 period (Table 3), education grew at a considerably 
slower rate than defense (64.3 percent). 
2. During the 1980 period, educational expenditures 
contracted at an average annual rate of 0.4 percent. Over this 
same period, the amount of resources allocated to defense 
increased at a rate of 3.1 percent per annum in real terms. 
3. It should be noted that education grew at a slower rate than 
total government expenditures during both sub-periods, while 
defense grew at a significantly higher rate during the 1973/80 
period and a slightly lower rate during the 1980/84 period. 
4. Government allocations to health showed similarities to 
education, increasing at an average annual rate of 40.2 percent 
over the 1973/80 period, only to decline at an average annual 
rate of 1.9 percent during the 1973/80 period. 
As a result of these expenditure patterns: 
1. The share of the government budget allocated to education 
declined from 19.8 percent in 1973 to 9.7 percent in 1984. 
2. Health expenditures remained fairly, but declined from 
10.1 percent of the government budget in 1975 to slightly over 
six percent in 1984. 
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TABLE3 
UAE: Central Government Budgetary Expenditures, 
1973-1984 
(million Dirhams, 1980 prices) 
Category 






































Notes: Based on data from: International Monetary Fund, 
Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, 1982, 1988. International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1991. 
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3. On the other hand, defense expenditures increased from 
13.2 percent of the Central Government budget to 54 percent 
in 1980. However, this ratio fell to 45.3 percent by 1984. 
While these trends are quite suggestive of budgetary trade-offs 
between defense and allocations to education/health, there may be 
other factors that could account for these patterns. On the surface, 
budgetary tradeoffs between defense and allocations to 
education/health would seem to be straightforward--a given 
budgetary increase in military expenditure will crowd out an 
equivalent amount of all other spending, and education and health 
will be reduced according to their proportion of the total. 
However, recent research has shown that this view of the 
budgetary process is simplistic and does , not conform with the 
manner in which governments often chose to prioritize 
expenditures. <12> 
In general, <13> programs once enlarged seem difficult to reduce, 
particularly if they generate large employment benefits. As to the 
choice of which sector to cut back, it is often felt that some sectors 
are more "vulnerable" than others to reductions. The defense 
sector, in particular, is usually considered difficult to 
reduce, while other sectors, particularly the social sectors such as 
health, education and rural development, are considered vulnerable. 
As noted in the UAE's case, this appears particularly true for 
the development section of the budget where major cuts in 
education and health took place during the post-1982 period of 
relative austerity. Apparently, the country has been more willing 
to cut spending on infrastructure and production which, of course, 
are likely to have adverse implications for longer term growth 
prospects, but few early, direct and immediate costs. 
This picture of austerity budgetary choice has been recently 
confirmed for other third world countries by McKinlay<14> who 
found that there was no evidence that third world military 
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expenditures are responsive to government financial constraints of 
a short or long term variety. 
In this respect, then, we infer that military expenditure 
has a life largely independent of central financial 
constraints, indicative therefore on its part of a substantial 
degree of autonomy. <15> 
With regard to budgetary priorities, McKinlay found that while 
a substantial commitment was made by Third World countries to 
the growth and expansion of education and health expenditure, that 
commitment was not nearly as high as in the area of military 
expenditure. In this respect, military expenditure was generally 
taken to be a higher priority. 
Finally, McKinlay found that Third World countries as a 
whole move their education and health expenditures in a much 
narrower band than their military expenditure. He found that 
military expendi~re had a greater independence or autonomy of 
movement. The greater harmony or synchronization between 
budget size and education/health expenditures could not be 
explained in terms of the size of education/health as opposed to 
military expenditure. 
As noted at the beginning of this section, simple zero sum 
models of budgetary shares are not appropriate for determining the 
impact that military expenditures have on human capital 
development in developing countries. Ultimately, this impact will 
depend not just on the UAE government's budgetary priorities, but 
perhaps more importantly on the degree of simultaneous expansion 
in the overall size of the economy and the government budget 
itself. 
To apply this general framework to the UAE's situation, it was 
assumed that the factors (with expected signs) affecting the share 
of education in the government budget were of the form: 
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EDU = f[GEP(?), DEF(-), OTHER(?), 
BUDG(+)] 
Where: 
EDU = the share of education in the budget. 
GEP = government expenditures per capita. 
DEF = the share of defense in the government budget. 
OTHER = the share of other various categories of expenditures in 
the budget. 
BUDG = the budgetary position of the government (revenues 
minus expenditures). 
RESULTS 
The resu1ts<16> (Table 4) of this analysis for the UAE over the 
1973-84 period indicated that: 
1. As might have been expected from the discussion of the 
general pattern of budgetary shares over time, educational 
expenditures have not expanded with government expenditures 
per capita. In fact, there has been a fairly strong negative 
relationship between the share of education in the public sector 
budget and the pattern of public expenditure per capita. 
2. The strongest negative budgetary trade-off with education 
came from social security and welfare expenditures and 
government allocations to housing. 
3. In general, the budgetary share allocated to defense had a 
weak but positive relationship with the educational share of the 
budget. 
4. The UAE government appears to have used budgetary 
surplus to expand the educational share of the budget. 
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TABLE4 
United Arab Emirates: Budgetary 
Tradeoffs, Total Education (1973-1984) 
Public Expenditure Per Capita (GEP) 
1. EDU = - 0.05 GEP 
(-2.86) 
RHO = 0.50, t = 1.92 r2 = 0.476; DW = 1.24 
Social Security/Welfare Expenditures (SSW) 
2. EDU= - 0.09 GEP - 0.91 SSW 
(-5.58) (-2.43) 
RHO = 0.18, t = 0.62 r2 = 0.833; DW = 1.26 
Budgetary Position (BUDG) 
3. EDU = - 0.10 GEP - 1.36 SSW + 0.03 BUDG 
(-7.72) (-3.96) (1.86) 
RHO =- 0.16, t = -0.55 r2 = 0.940; DW = 1.20 
Defense (DEF) 
4. EDU= - 0.10 GEP - 1.11 SSW+ 0.03 BUDG + 
(-8,97) (-2.96) (2.04) 
0.06 DEF 
(1.49) 
RHO = -0.25, t = -0.87 r2 = 0.962; DW = 1.39 
Health (HE) 
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5. EDU = - 0.10 GEP - 1.32 SSW + 0.03 BUDG + 
(-8.10) (-4.43) (1.74) 
0.55 HE 
(1.83) 
RHO = -0.23, t = -0.81; r2 = 0.966; DW = 1.16 
(continued) 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
United Arab Emirates: Budgetary 
Tradeoffs, Total Education (1973-1984) 
Housing (HOU) 
6. EDU = - 0.12 GEP - 1.26 SSW + 0.02 BUDG -
0.29 HOU 
(-3.99) 
(-17.18) (-6.51) (2.77) 
RHO = -0.64, t = -2.83 r2 = 0.991; DW = 2.20 
Other Social (OS) 
7. EDU = - 0.11 GEP - 1.88 SSW + 0.04 BUDG + 
0.78 OS 
(1.85) 
(-11.33) (-5.97) (2.97) 
RHO = -0.59, t = -2.47 r2 = 0.977; DW = 1.41 
Other Purposes (OP) 
8. EDU = - 0.12 GEP - 1.32 SSW+ 0.02 BUDG -
0.37 OP 
(-2.00) 
(-9.93) (-4.58) (1.63) 
RHO = -0.34, t = -1.21 r2 = 0.972; DW = 2.15 
LOONEY 
Notes: Based on data from: International Monetary Fund, 
Govemme111 Finance Statistics Yearbook, 1982, 1991. International 
Monetary Fund, I111emational Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1988, 
1991. All budgetary variables are a percentage of government 
expenditures. ( ) = t statistic; r2 = coefficient of determination; 
F = F statistic; DW = Durbin Watson Statistic. 
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Similarly, during periods of austerity the educational share of 
the budget suffers proportional cuts. 
It is fairly clear that defense has not expanded its share of the 
budget at the expense of education. The observed decline in the 
educational share of the budget appears to be more related to 
general budgetary considerations than any explicit set of 
priorities involving defense. In large part, the increase in the share 
of defense in the budget in recent years (and the corresponding 
reduction in education's share) has occurred because of the 
contrasting relationship each of these expenditure patterns has with 
the overall budgetary position (Table 5): 
1. Decreases in the government's budgetary position 
(revenues minus expenditures) have been closely associated 
with increases in the defense share of the budget. 
2. On the other hand increases in the share of education in the 
budget have occurred during periods of increased budgetary 
surplus. The Same is also true for social security and welfare, 
and to a lesser extent housing and economic expenditures. 
These patterns confirm McKinley's findings that defense 
expenditures are more stable over time and appear to be much less , 
susceptible to budgetary austerity measures than educational or 
other social expenditures. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Government's twin goals of reducing public expenditure 
and reducing the size of the foreign workforce are clearly 
irreconcilable, and it is difficult to see how any major reductions 
in the foreign workforce will come about without the government 
giving education a higher priority. Interestingly enough, the 
shortage of funds allocated to education does not appear to be 
related to the budgetary decisions concerning defense. 
TABLES 
United Arab Emirates: Factors 
Affecting Government Budgetary Position (1973-1984) 
Defense (DEF), Government Revenues/GDP (RY), 
EDUCATION (EDU) 
1. BUDG = - 1.66 DEF+ 0.06 RY+ 7.12 EDU 
(-2.43) (2.02) (2.36) 
RHO = 0.19, t = 0.64 r2 = 0.590; DW = 2.04 
Social Security/ Welfare Expenditures (SSW) 
2. BUDG = - 1.05 DEF + 0.09 RY + 8.10 EDU + 
9.84 SSW 
(2.46) 
(-1.83) (3.48) (3.59) 
RHO = 0.06, t = 0.22 r2 = 0.812; DW = 1.76 
Housing (HOU) 
3. BUDG = - 1.12 DEF + 0.07 RY + 7 .36 EDU + 
4.54 HOU 
(1.63) 
(-1.56) (2.47) (2.46) 
RHO = 0.38, t = 1.35 r2 = 0.664; DW = 2.05 
Other Social (OS) 
4. BUDG = - 2.34 DEF + 0.07 RY + 8.12 EDU -
14.38 OS 
(-1.78) 
(-3.26) (2.49) (2.91) 
RHO = 0.25, t = 0.09 r2 = 0.716; DW = 2.09 
Mining, Manufacturing, and Construction (MMC) 
5. BUDG = - 0.99 DEF + 0.06 RY + 6.00 EDU + 
(-1.65) (2.59) (2.50) 
77.17 MMC 
(2.38) 
RHO = 0.21, t = 0.74 r2 = 0.784; DW = 1.72 
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Perhaps in part, the relative decline of education in the public 
sector budget has stemmed from the government's wish to reduce 
educational benefits to expatriates. To the extent that this is the 
case, the prospects for replacing foreign workers with nationals 
will be brighter than the analysis above indicates. On the other 
hand, it is clear that jobs in engineering, government and 
commerce are better paid and enjoy a higher status than teaching. 
While the government has made the teaching profession more 
attractive to natives through cutting teacher training courses from 
two years to one and exempted students from certain parts of 
degree courses (in addition to allowing them to interrupt and then 
resume their studies), it is hard to see very many local students 
pursuing a teaching career unless salaries are significantly 
increased. Without a major change in the government's funding 
of education, the projected increase in the number of teachers 
needed over the next decade and a half (from 14,000 in 1984 to 
26,000 by 2000) will only contribute further to the country's 
dependence on foreign manpower. 
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